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Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 
T HE V ARlETY AND QUANTITY of Professor Leslie Green's work on the law of armed conflict make it nearly impossible to choose a subject that 
has not already been covered by him. This also holds true for the law of naval 
warfare. Suffice it to mention that Professor Green was one of the most impor~ 
tant members of the Round Table of Experts that drafted the San Remo Man~ 
ual on International Law applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea. l It was on that 
occasion that the author first met Professor Green and since then he has con~ 
tinuously profited from Professor Green's deep knowledge of the law and of the 
practical issues involved. The discussions with him, especially on controversial 
questions, have always been a delight. The present contribution on the law of 
naval blockade is therefore but a modest expression of the author's gratitude to 
a practitioner, teacher and academician who will certainly continue to influ~ 
ence strongly the progressive development of the law of armed conflict. 
Introduction 
According to a widely accepted definition, blockade is "a belligerent opera~ 
tion to prevent vessels and/or aircraft of all nations, enemy as well as neutral, 
from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, 
occupied by, or under the control of an enemy nation."2 The purpose of 
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establishing a blockade is "to deny the enemy the use of enemy and neutral ves, 
sels or aircraft to transport personnel and goods to or from enemy territory."3 If 
solely aimed against the enemy's economy, the legality of a blockade has to be 
judged in the light of the law of economic warfare and of the law of neutrality. 
However, in contrast to the practice of the 19th century and of the two World 
Wars, in modem State practice such economic blockades have been the excep, 
tion. Today the establishment of a blockade is very often an integral part of a 
military operation that is not directed against the enemy's economy but against 
its armed forces. For example, a blockade may be declared and enforced in 
preparation of a landing operation. It may also help in surrounding enemy 
armed forces or in cutting off their lines of supply. But even if an economic 
blockade in the strict sense were established, there would always be a strategic 
element: cutting off the enemy's trade links and weakening its economy will 
also weaken its military power of resistance.4 No matter which purpose is pur, 
sued by the establishment of a blockade, it always involves the use of military 
force directed against the enemy's coastline or ports. Accordingly, a blockade is 
a method of naval warfare to which the general principles and rules of the law 
of naval warfare-the maritime jus in bello-also apply.5 
While naval blockades still have to be distinguished from other, although re, 
lated, concepts (e.g., operations designed to interdict contraband, unilateral 
embargoes, defensive measure zones, and exclusion zones) ,6 there is no longer 
any need to deal separately with so-called "pacific blockades."7 Since the estab, 
lishment of a "pacific blockade" involves the use of military force by one State 
against another State, there is an international armed conflict in the sense of 
common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The (maritime) jus in bello 
applies to all belligerent measures taken in such conflicts. The existence of a 
state of war is not a precondition for the legality of certain methods and means 
of warfare anymore. If they are taken, they have to be in accordance with the 
applicable jus in bello. Hence, the same rules will apply in either case. 
Whether and to what extent the jus ad bellum also serves as a legal yardstick 
for naval blockades is a highly disputed issue. Leslie Green has always taken the 
position that the jus in bello and the jus ad bellum are distinct from one anotherB 
and it has always been an ambitious task to take the opposing view. However, 
this is not the proper place to reenter that discussion and to repeat arguments 
put forward elsewhere.9 An interesting issue that is also far from settled, but 
that does need to be addressed here is the question of whether and to what ex, 
tent the rules governing naval blockades also apply to blockades established in 
accordance with Article 42 of the UN Charter. 
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Before entering into that question the present article will first offer an over~ 
view of the development of the law of naval blockade in State practice and in 
international treaties and drafts. An assessment of the current state of the law 
of blockade by special reference to the legal literature will follow. 
Development of Blockade Law in State Practice 
and International Instruments 
As blockades were originally restricted to coastal fortifications, they differed 
only slightly from sieges in land warfare. 10 With the increasing importance of 
sea trade at the end of the 16th century, it became necessary to also cut off the 
enemy's sea links without taking possession of the respective part of the coast~ 
line or port. 11 Presumably, the first naval blockade was declared by the Dutch 
in 1584. The Flemish ports that then were under Spanish control were declared 
barred in order to cut off the Spanish troops from supplies. 12 In fact, this block~ 
ade, as well as subsequent blockades, was declared for the sole purpose of en~ 
abling the Dutch to seize neutral merchant vessels even if they were not 
carrying enemy or contraband goods. 13 In the early 17th century, Hugo Grotius 
took the view that regardless of their contraband character all goods destined 
to a blockaded location were subject to capture and seizure provided their de~ 
livery jeopardized the success of the closure of the respective enemy port. That, 
according to Grotius, was the case if surrender or peace were imminent. 14 State 
practice at the close of the 16th and during the 17th centuries, however, fails to 
evidence general acceptance of such a restriction. Hence, one hundred years 
later, Cornelius van Bynkershoek could easily establish that Grotius' opinion 
was not in accordance with existing treaties and edicts or even reason. IS 
Although a blockade affected all ships and goods regardless of their enemy 
or contraband character, 16 in those days belligerents were not obliged to main~ 
tain and enforce a blockade by a sufficient number of warships. Regularly, they 
were "fictitious" or, to use the more popular expression, "paper blockades" 
(also called "blocus de Cabinet" or "blocus per notificationem") 17 that were not 
enforced by capture in case of breach. Rather, as laid down in the Dutch decree 
ofJune 26, 1630,18 or in the Anglo~Dutch Treaty of Whitehall (1689),19 ships 
could be captured at far distance from the blockaded area if it was established 
that they clearly intended to breach the blockade ("droit de prevention").20 
Thus, the basis was laid for the doctrine of "continuous voyage," according to 
which ships destined to a neutral port are subject to capture if their ultimate 
destination is a blockaded port. According to the "droit de suite," ships were 
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subject to capture not only during a breach of blockade and subsequent pursuit, 
but also until they reached their port of destination. 
Despite Danish and Swedish resistance that was in part successful in the last 
decade of the 17th century, England and Holland did not give up their practice 
of "fictitious blockades."21 Moreover, England, especially in the 18th century, 
maintained that the French and Spanish ports were blockaded by the mere 
geographical situation of the English islands.22 That practice, as well as the 
stem application of the law of contraband, resulted in grave restrictions on 
neutral merchant shipping. Therefore, affected States reacted by means of the 
first armed neutrality.23 In her famous declaration of February 28, 1780,24 the 
Russian Czarina Katharine II claimed that blockades, in order to be legal, 
needed to be effective: 
Que pour determiner ce qui caracterise un port bloque, on n'accorde cette 
denomination qu'a celui ou il y a, par la dispOSition de la puissance qui l'attaqlle 
avec des vaisseallx arretes et suffisamment proches, un danger evident d'entrer. 
While a considerable number of European States acknowledged the princi~ 
pIe of effectiveness in their treaties,25 England continued its practice of ficti~ 
tious blockades.26 After neutral merchant shipping had again been severely 
affected by Anglo~French hostilities, some European powers reacted by a sec~ 
ond armed neutralityP Russia, Denmark, Sweden and Prussia, in their treaties 
of December 14 and 16, 1800, confirmed the principles of the first armed neu~ 
trality, especially the requirement that a blockade needed to be effective.28 
This requires a blockade, in order to be binding, to be maintained by a force suf~ 
ficient actually to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. The blockading 
power, according to those treaties, was obliged to inform neutral shipping of 
the blockade. 
The principle of effectiveness was later expressly confirmed in Article III, 
paragraph 4, of the Anglo~Russian Treaty ofJune 17, 1801, to which Denmark 
(October 23, 1801) and Sweden (March 30, 1802) acceded.29 Still, the block~ 
ade of England effected by the Decree of Berlin of November 21, 1806,30 and by 
the Decree of Milan of December 17, 1807,31 as well as the blockade of France 
and its allies by Orders~in~Council of January 7 and November 11, 1807,32were 
hardly in conformity with that principle, for neutral trade was interfered with 
by all means at hand. The time of the continental blockade has, therefore, cor~ 
rectly been characterized as a decisive step backwards in the development of 
international law governing the belligerent rights in naval warfare)3 
Despite the aspirations of some south~American States,34 it was not until 
the Crimean War (1854-1856) that the English and continental European 
206 
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg 
positions on the law of blockade could be reconciled. In view of the Anglo~ 
French alliance against Russia, it had become imperative to adjust the rules for 
the respective naval forces. This explains why France, England, Austria, Prus~ 
sia, Russia, Sardinia and Turkey were able to agree in the Paris Declaration of 
April 16, 1856,35 upon the principle, among others, of effectiveness: 
Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained by 
a force sufficient r~ally to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. 
Thus, fictitious or paper blockades had become illegal. It must be stressed, 
however, that the Paris Declaration fell behind the rules agreed upon during 
the armed neutralities. In particular, it lacks a clear definition of what is to be 
understood by "effective." On the other hand, an obligation similar to that of 
the armed neutralities according to which the blockading warships must be 
"arretes et suffisamment proches," in view of the introduction of torpedo boats 
and the improvement of coastal artilleries, would not have been feasible 
anyway.36 Altogether, the requirement of effectiveness was not interpreted 
restrictively. It was not necessary for the blockading warships to be stationed at 
visual range from the coast. There existed no clear rule on the number of 
warships necessary.37 Rather, the effectiveness of a blockade was to be judged 
in the light of the circumstances of each single case.38 Hence, even blockades 
whose effectiveness could only be ascertained after a lapse of time were 
generally accepted as binding.39 The application of the doctrine of continuous 
voyage to blockades led to a further erosion of the principle of effectiveness.40 
The Second Peace Conference at the Hague (1907) did not succeed in 
reaching agreement upon the international law governing naval blockades. At 
the beginning of the conference Great Britain had proposed the following 
article: 
L'emploi de mines sous~marines automatiques de contact pour etablir au 
maintenir un blocus de commerce est interdit.41 
In the course of the conference, that proposal was not discussed further in 
the Third Commission.42 In its report and draft convention, the Comite 
d'examen merely included the following paragraph 3 in Article 4: 
II est interdit de placer des mines automatiques de contact devant les cotes et les 
ports de l'adversaire dans Ie seul but d'intercepter la navigation de commerce.43 
With regard to that rule the Comite d'examen held that 
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il s'agirait seulement de determiner, en examinant les mines, comme moyen de 
nuire a l'ennemi, si l'on peut s'en servir dans Ie but de barrer la navigation 
commerciale de l'adversaire--question a laquelle, parait-il, on devrait f<!pondre 
negativement. Cela etabli, on pourrait confier au Comite Ie soin de bien faire 
ressortir cette pensee commune, tout en laissant hors de discussion l'application, 
au sujet de l'emploi des mines, des principes de la Declaration de Paris 
concernant l'effectivite du blocus.44 
Although the Third Commission did not intend to agree on rules applicable 
to blockades, some of the participants drew the conclusion that Article 4, para-
graph 3, prohibited the establishment of a blockade by the laying of mines 
only.45 Be that as it may, the vague formulation in Article 2 of Hague Conven-
tion VIII (which is identical with Article 4, paragraph 3, of the draft) gave-
and still gives-rise to dispute. But even if the provision applied to an enforce-
ment of a blockade by naval mines, it would be quite difficult to establish 
whether its sole purpose was, indeed, to intercept commercial navigation.46 
Hence, it was left to the 1909 London Conference to codify the law applica-
ble to naval blockades. The 21 articles devoted to that subject in the 1909 Lon-
don Declaration can be summarized as follows:47 A blockade, in order to be 
binding, must be effective, that is to say, it must be maintained by a force suffi-
cient really to prevent access to the enemy coastline (Article 2). Whether that 
precondition is met is, however, a question of fact (Article 3). The delegates to 
the 1909 Conference were unable to agree upon a more specific rule. They ex-
pected that the determination of effectiveness was in any case reserved to the 
competent (international or national) prize court.48 According to Article 4, a 
blockade is not regarded as raised, and thus remains effective, if the blockading 
force is temporarily withdrawn on account of stress of weather. It must be ap-
plied impartially to the ships of all nations (Article 5), and warships (Article 6) 
and merchant vessels in distress (Article 7) may be allowed to enter and leave a 
blockaded port or place. The declaration and notification are constitutive for a 
blockade's legality (Articles 8, 10, and 11) .49 A declaration of blockade is made 
either by the blockading power or by the naval authorities acting in its name. It 
must specify (1) the date when the blockade begins, (2) the geographical limits 
of the coastline under blockade, and (3) the period within which neutral ves-
sels may come out (Article 9). Additionally, it must be notified to both neutral 
powers and the local authorities (Article 11). The provisions on declaration 
and notification also apply to cases where the limits of a blockade are extended 
or where a blockade is re-established after having been raised (Article 12). No-
tice is similarly required upon the voluntary raising or any restriction in the lim-
its of a blockade (Article 13). If no declaration of blockade has been notified to 
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the local authorities, or if no period of grace has been provided, neutral vessels 
must be allowed to leave the blockaded area (Article 16, paragraph 2). Vessels 
that in actual or presumptive knowledge of the blockade5o attempt to leave or 
enter the closed port may be captured as long as they are being pursued by a 
warship of the blockading force and are subject to condemnation (Articles 14, 
17, 20, and 21). The limitation of the right of capture to the area of operation of 
the warships detailed to render the blockade effective is the result of a compro, 
mise between the English and the continental European position. In any event, 
according to Articles 17, 19, and 20, neither the doctrine of continuous voyage 
nor the "droit de suite" that had been practiced excessively during the 18th 
century survived.51 In case of a vessel approaching a blockaded port, without 
(actual or presumptive) knowledge of the blockade, notification must be made 
to the vessel itself (Article 16 paragraph 1). Finally, a blockade must be con, 
fined to ports and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy (Article 1) and 
may not bar access to neutral ports or coasts (Article 18). 
Although the 1909 London Declaration never entered into force because of 
resistance by the House of Lords to ratification, its provisions on blockade were 
observed during the Balkan Wars and were included in a number of national 
prize regulations. 52 Apart from the applicability of the doctrine of continuous 
voyage, at the beginning of the First World War they were generally regarded as 
customary in character. 53 However, in view of the rapid development of weap, 
ons technologies (long distance artillery, submarines, military aircraft) and the 
necessary modification of naval strategies and tactics it soon became impossible 
to observe Articles 1 ff. of the London Declaration. The traditional blockade 
was replaced by the long,distance blockade that-by a simultaneous excessive 
application of the doctrine of continuous voyage-in fact led to the barring of 
neutral ports and coasts.54 Neutral trade was subjected to far,reaching control 
measures, some even taken in their respective home ports. For instance, mer' 
chant vessels that did not possess a navicert were either diverted or captured, 
even if they had not approached blockaded coasts or ports. Moreover, the 
belligerents established huge minefields and exclusion zones ("Sperrgebiete") 
within which all vessels, regardless of the flag they were flying, were attacked 
without prior warning.55 During the Second World War that practice was re, 
peated and led to even further restrictions of neutral trade.56 To give but one 
example of the excessive use of the right of blockade, it suffices to quote the 
British Order,in,Council of November 27, 1939: 
1. Every merchant vessel which sailed from any enemy port, including any port in 
territory under enemy occupation or control, after the 4th day of December, 
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1939, may be required to discharge in a British or Allied port any goods on board 
laden in such enemy port. 
2. Every merchant vessel which sailed from a port other than an enemy port after 
the 4th day of December, 1939, having on board goods which are of enemy origin 
or are enemy property may be required to discharge such goods in a British or 
Allied port. 
3. Goods discharged in a British port under either of the preceding Articles shall 
be placed in the custody of the Marshal of the Prize Court, and, unless the Court 
orders them to be requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, shall be detained or 
sold under the direction of the Court. The proceeds of goods so sold shall be paid 
into the Court. 
On the conclusion of peace such proceeds and any goods detained but not 
sold shall be dealt with in such manner as the Court may in the circumstances 
deem just, provided that nothing herein shall prevent the payment out of 
Court of any such proceeds or the release of any goods at any time (a) if it be 
shown to the satisfaction of the Court that the goods had become neutral 
property before the date of this Order, or (b) with the consent of the proper 
officer of the Crown. 
4. The law and practice in Prize shall, so far as applicable, be followed in all cases 
arising under this Order. 
5. Nothing in this Order shall affect the liability of any vessel or goods to seizure 
or condemnation independently of this Order. 
6. For the purposes of this Order. the words "goods which are of enemy origin" 
shall include goods having their origin in any territory under enemy occupation 
or control, and the words "goods which [ ... J are enemy property" shall include 
goods belonging to any person in any such territory. 
7. Proceeding under this Order may be taken in any Prize Court having 
jurisdiction to which the Prize Court Rules, 1939, apply. 
8. For the purposes of this Order the words "British port" mean any port within 
the jurisdiction of any Prize Court to which the Prize Court Rules, 1939, apply.57 
In view of that practice, Frits Kalshoven has concluded that 
[ ••• J developments in the techniques of naval and aerial warfare have turned the 
establishment and maintenance of a naval blockade in the traditional sense into 
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a virtual impossibility. It would seem, therefore, that the rules in the Declaration 
on blockade in time of war are now mainly of historical interest. 58 
Some consider the British practice a contribution to the progressive devel, 
opment of the international law On blockades.59 Still others stress the fact that 
the United Kingdom had justified its practice by reference to reprisals. Hence, 
they maintain, the London Declaration has not been substantively derogated 
by that practice. They merely concede that the requirement of effectiveness to' 
day has to be interpreted in the light of the development of weapons technolo, 
gies, such that the blockading forces may be deployed at some distance from 
enemy coasts and ports.60 
In fact, the limitations of the traditional blockade law have, to a consider, 
able extent, been observed in the practice of States since 1945. Of course, the 
principle of effectiveness as well as the requirement of maintaining and enforc, 
ing a blockade by solely surface warships have been modified. Moreover, it 
seems that today aircraft may also be subjected to blockade measures. Still, the 
law as laid down in the 1909 London Declaration has not become obsolete. 
The closure of the areas and ports under the control of communist China 
declared by the national Chinese government on June 26, 1949, although not 
justified as blockade, widely conformed with the traditional rules. Both the 
measures to be taken and the geographical limits were declared and notified in 
advance. The national Chinese armed forces were able to effectively enforce 
the closure/blockade because, by deploying reconnaissance aircraft, they were 
fully and constantly aware of all movements within the Chinese territorial 
sea.61 
During the Korean War the U.S.fUN naval armed forces, because of their 
superiority, were able to maintain and enforce the blockade declared On July 4, 
1950, in nearly full accordance with the provisions of the London Declara--
tion.62 Warships-except of the North Korean navy-were excluded, as was 
the port of Rashin that served as a naval base of the former Soviet navy.63 
During its 1971 conflict, the Indian navy closed the entire coast of BangIa, 
desh. The superior Indian navy was supported by military aircraft deployed On 
the carrier Vikrant. Thus, all vessels were successfully prevented from entering 
or leaving the blockaded area. Altogether, six merchant ships and numerous 
small boats were captured. Those small boats that did not comply with the or, 
ders given by the warships' commanders were attacked and sunk.64 
The blockade of Haiphong in May 1972 also widely corresponded with the 
requirements of a classical blockade, although, again, the notion "blockade" 
was not used. Prior to the closure becoming effective, it was publicly 
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announced and all States presumably affected were informed.65 However, it 
was not maintained and enforced by surface units but by mines laid by aircraft. 
Those mines became automatically armed after a predetermined period of time 
had elapsed.66 
The Egyptian blockades ofEilat and of the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967 and of the 
Bab el~Mandeb in 197367 were similar to the British blockades of World War II 
insofar as the forces entrusted with their enforcement were deployed at a con~ 
siderable distance from the areas in question. Still, the Egyptian measures were 
effective because no vessel could enter or leave the areas without running the 
risk of being attacked. 
At the beginning of the Iran~Iraq conflict (1980-1988), Iran, on September 
22, 1980, declared the transport of all goods and cargoes to Iraq prohibited.68 
The Iranian naval forces were in a position to enforce that prohibition, as well 
as the closure of the Shat~al~Arab, which was declared on October 1, 1980,69 
during the course of the entire armed conflict. Altogether 71 neutral merchant 
ships were affected by the closure of the Shat~al~Arab. Iran offered to allow 
them to leave the area under the condition that they flew the UN flag. How~ 
ever, Iraq required those ships to fly the Iraqi flag as long as they were within 
the Shat~al~Arab. 70 
In most of these cases, neutral States, in view of the lack of protests, obvi~ 
ously accepted the blockades)1 If at all, they merely doubted their legality un~ 
der the jus ad bellum not the jus in bello. For example, the British government 
protested against the blockade of the Shat~al~Arabn because, in its view, the 
right of self~defense did not allow its establishment. However, the British gov~ 
ernment did not consider the Iranian measures illegal under the maritime jus in 
bello. 
The customary character of the principles of the 1909 London Declaration 
is also widely acknowledged in the military manuals of the U.S. Navy,73 and of 
the Canadian 74 and German 75 armed forces. According to those manuals, 
blockades must be restricted to ports or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, 
or under the control of the enemy. They must not bar access to or departure 
from neutral ports and coasts.76 The declaration, either by the government or 
by the commander of the blockading force, must include the details laid down 
in Article 9 of the London Declaration and must be notified to affected neutral 
States and to the local authorities,77 Because knowledge of the existence of a 
blockade is an essential element of the offenses of breach and attempted breach 
of blockade, neutral vessels are always entitled to notification.78 Moreover, ac~ 
cording to the three manuals, a blockade, in order to be valid, must be effective. 
That means that it must be maintained by a force or other mechanism 79 that is 
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sufficient to render ingress or egress of the blockaded area dangerous. The tem, 
porary absence of the blockading force is without prejudice to the blockade's 
effectiveness, if such absence is due to stress of weather or to some other reason 
connected with the blockade.8o The blockade need not be restricted to vessels; 
it may also be applied and enforced against aircraft.81 In any event, a blockade 
must be applied impartially to the vessels of all States, including merchant ships 
flying the flag of the blockading power.82 However, although neutral warships 
and military aircraft enjoy no positive right of access to blockaded areas, the 
belligerent imposing the blockade may authorize their entry and exit.83 Neutral 
vessels in distress should not be prevented from entering and subsequently 
leaving a blockaded area.84 According to the U.S. and the German manuals, a 
further exception applies to neutral vessels (and aircraft) engaged in the car' 
riage of qualifying relief supplies for the civilian population and the sick and 
wounded. Those vessels should be authorized to pass through the blockade 
cordon (safe passage).85 The German manual and Canadian draft manual con, 
tain provisions according to which starvation of the civilian population as a 
method of warfare is prohibited.86 Neutral vessels and aircraft that, in knowl, 
edge of a notified and effective blockade, breach or attempt to breach a block, 
ade are subject to capture.87 If they resist an attempt to establish identity, 
including visit and search, they may be attacked.88 
The Contemporary Law of Blockade 
As already mentioned, some authors consider traditional blockades to have 
become obsolete because, in their view, developments in weapons technologies 
have made it impossible for belligerents to comply with the strict requirements 
of blockade law.89 The short overview of modem State practice has shown, 
however, that States will continue to make use of this method of naval warfare 
at least in cases in which they possess superior naval forces and aerial recon, 
naissance capabilities. Blockade remains an especially efficient method for sub, 
duing the enemy in limited armed conflicts.90 Moreover, it is the only way by 
which a belligerent is entitled to prevent the enemy from not only the import 
but also the export of goods that would otherwise enable it to continue the 
armed conflict. Neutral commercial sea and air traffic can be subjected to 
far,reaching restrictions, even if they carry goods that do not qualify as contra, 
band.91 Hence, as in the beginning of the 20th century, identifying the legal re, 
strictions that apply if a belligerent decides to establish and enforce a naval 
blockade is indispensable. It may be added that according to the position taken 
here, a special theoretical justification92 is no longer necessary because the 
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maritime jus in bello is appropriately considered a legal order of necessity that 
prescribes the minimum standards that have to be observed by States, even if 
they are unwilling or unable to refrain from the use of armed force.93 
Declaration, Notification, Impartiality and Effectiveness. In general, States 
are willing to accept the customary character of the principles laid down in the 
1909 London Declaration. When it comes to the specification of the rights and 
duties, however, no general agreement exists. Of course, it is undisputed94 that 
• a blockade must be declared and that the declaration must contain the 
details laid down in Article 9 of the London Declaration; 
• it must be notified to those affected; and 
• impartial application is required. 
According to the prevailing position in legal literature, neutral vessels are to be 
granted a period of grace to leave the blockaded port or roadstead.95 
The reason for this wide agreement is that these requirements do not pose 
any considerable problems. The belligerent establishing a blockade will, of 
course, be interested in informing all those possibly affected, since it is the ob-
ject and purpose of a blockade to close certain enemy areas and to cut them off. 
In addition, today such information will not take long to reach its addressees. 
Rather, it can be disseminated universally within a couple of hours.96 Finally, 
any discrimination, in view of the practical problems of identification, would 
not be practicable. 
Problems and disagreement exist, however, with regard to the principle of 
effectiveness. The authors only agree that when judging the effectiveness of a 
blockade the development of modern weapons systems have to be taken into 
consideration-a stipulation that was first raised prior to World War I and 
which obviously is generally recognized now.97 Accordingly, it is no longer nec-
essary for the blockading force to be deployed in close vicinity to the coast, it 
may also be stationed at some distance seaward as long as ingress or egress con-
tinues to be dangerous.98 Whether that is the case cannot be determined in 
abstracto but, as in Article 3 of the London Declaration, remains a question of 
fact.99 There exists, however, an ultimate legal limitation with regard to the 
area affected. A blockade must be restricted to coastal areas and ports belong-
ing to, occupied by, or under the control of the enemy. It may not be estab-
lished outside the general area of naval warfare. IOO 
For the purpose of maintaining and enforcing a blockade, belligerents are 
not restricted to the use of surface warships. This means that they may choose a 
combination oflegitimate methods and means of warfare provided this combi-
nation does not result in acts inconsistent with the other rules and principles of 
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the maritime jus in bello.101 In view of the overall importance of aerial recon, 
naissance and of the legitimate incorporation of the airspace into the regime of 
blockades, 102 a blockade may be maintained by military aircraft, submarines or 
even by naval mines.103 However, a blockade may not be maintained and en, 
forced by naval mines alone. This prohibition does not follow from Article 2 of 
Hague Convention VIII of 1907, for it is nearly impossible to prove that the 
mines have been laid "for the sole purpose of intercepting commercial naviga, 
tion."104 Rather, it has to be observed in this context that certain categories of 
vessels and aircraft may not be denied ingress or egress. Hence, generally, it is 
necessary that manned units (or "at least one man-o,war") 105 are present in the 
vicinity of the blockaded area in order to make sure that such vehicles remain 
unharmed.106 The mining of Haiphong is merely a single incident that fails to 
establish the contrary, even though only the former USSR raised protests 
against it. 107 Despite the obvious perils submarines and missiles pose to surface 
warships, in most cases the presence of at least one surface unit, for humanitar, 
ian reasons, remains an indispensable requirement for the legality of a naval 
blockade. And it makes no difference whether the blockade serves strictly mili, 
tary or economic purposes.108 Only if controlled mines are laid may their sole 
use for maintaining and enforcing a blockade be legitimate. Of course, apart 
from naval mines, other obstacles, such as wrecks, can be used to close a port or 
a part of the enemy's coast.109 
Consequences of Breach and Attempted Breach of Blockade. It is generally 
acknowledged that vessels (and aircraft) breaking or attempting to break 
blockade are liable to capture.110 If, after prior warning, they clearly resist 
capture, they may be attacked. 111 However, it remains unclear which behavior 
may be characterized as attempted (inward112) breach of blockade. While the 
German Manual is silent on this issue, the U.S. Manualll3 defines attempted 
breach of blockade as follows: 
Attempted breach of blockade occurs from the time a vessel or aircraft leaves a 
port or airfield with the intention of evading the blockade, and for vessels exiting 
the blockaded area, continues until the voyage is completed. [ ... ] It is immaterial 
that the vessel or aircraft is at the time of interception bound for neutral territory, 
if its ultimate destination is the blockaded area. There is a presumption of 
attempted breach of blockade where vessels or aircraft are bound for a neutral 
port or airfield serving as a point of transit to the blockaded area. 
This implies that the doctrine of continuous voyage may be applied to the Ie, 
gal regime of naval blockades. As in the beginning of the 20th century, this 
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question is a matter of dispute in the legalliterature. II4 There are good reasons 
to maintain that the doctrine of continuous voyage may not be applied to 
blockades. First, neutrals have only in rare cases been willing to tolerate inter~ 
ference with their merchant shipping in areas distant from blockaded coasts or 
ports. II5 Second, the doctrine has not played a significant role in the practice of 
States since 1945. It has only been recognized in the military manuals of some 
Anglo~American States. Most continental European authors have always re~ 
jected the doctrine's applicability to blockade. II6 The arguments put fonvard 
do not have to be repeated. Ifblockade law is perceived as part of an order of 
necessity that, by its nature, has to be interpreted restrictively and that merely 
modifies but does not abrogate the peacetime rules of international law appli~ 
cable between belligerents and neutrals, an obligation of States not participat~ 
ing in an international armed conflict to tolerate belligerent measures can be 
justified only under strict conditions. In the context of blockade, one of these 
conditions is the principle of effectiveness. That principle would be rendered 
meaningless if belligerents were entitled to enforce a blockade at a far distance 
from the area in question. As long as neutral merchant vessels are situated out~ 
side the range of operations of the forces maintaining the blockade, and as long 
as they do not carry contraband or act in a way that makes them liable to at~ 
tack, the freedoms of navigation and overflight supersede the belligerents' in~ 
terest in a comprehensive prohibition of imports to their respective enemies. 
Of course, the practical consequences of this position are of a solely secondary 
nature. If a neutral merchant vessel is captured outside the range of operation 
of the blockade forces because it-in fact or presumably-was destined to a 
blockaded port, that violation of the law of neutrality results in a duty to return 
the vessel and its cargo and to compensate any damage. 
Relief for the Civilian Population and the Wounded and Sick. A blockade 
preventing all ingress to or egress from the blockaded area by vessels and 
aircraft, in general, negatively affects the civilian population's supply of food 
and other objects essential for survival. For that reason it was-at least to a 
certain extent-justified to characterize the British long~distance blockades as 
"hunger blockades."117 Still, that notion should not be used too easily. In 
World War II, the United Kingdom maintained that naval blockades did not 
differ from sieges in land warfare in which the responsible commander was 
under no duty to allow food and other goods to pass into the town. I IS 
Today, according to Article 54, paragraph 1, Additional Protocol I, "starva~ 
tion of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited." Contrary to an assertion 
by the Australian delegation to the Geneva Diplomatic Conference,II9 as well 
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as some authors,120 the position of that provision in Part IV of the Additional 
Protocol I does not prevent its application to naval blockades. Blockade is, in 
the sense of Article 49, paragraph 3, Additional Protocol I, a method of "sea 
warfare which may affect the civilian population [ ... J on land." Therefore, 
States parties to Additional Protocol I may not establish and maintain a block, 
ade that serves the specific purpose of denying them essential foodstuffs, 
"whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to 
move away, or for any other motive."121 As part of customary international law, 
the prohibition of starving the civilian population by the establishment of ana, 
val blockade is also binding on States not party to Additional Protocol I, since 
it follows from the generally accepted principles of humanity and proportional, 
ity.122 Methods and means of naval warfare are illegal "if the damage to the ci, 
vilian population is, or may be expected to be, excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."123 In that context, it 
makes no difference whether the blockade serves genuine military or economic 
purposes. Moreover, even States not bound by Additional Protocol I recognize 
that belligerents are under an obligation not to prohibit relief consignments in 
case of a naval blockade. 124 That obligation, which is also recognized in the lit, 
erature,125 would be meaningless absent prohibition of a so' called "hunger 
blockade." The military and strategic interests involved are met by the fact that 
relief consignments must be granted free passage subject to 
• the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, 
under which such passage is permitted; and 
• the condition that the distribution of such supplies shall be made under 
the local supervision of a Protecting Power or a humanitarian 
organization which offers guarantees of impartiality, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.126 
Blockades under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
The final question that remains is whether the rules just described also apply 
if a blockade is ordered by the Security Council pursuant to Article 42 of the 
UN Charter.127 In an annotation to paragraph 7.7.2.1, NWP1,14M, the au, 
thors hold that "it is not possible to say whether, or to what extent, a UN block, 
ade would be governed by the traditional rules."128 This statement is certainly 
correct insofar as the Security Council, when taking action under Chapter VII, 
has a wide range of discretion and that it-as an organ of the UN-is not di, 
recdy bound by rules of international law that are primarily designed to regu, 
late the conduct of States in situations of armed conflict. On the other hand, a 
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blockade ordered by the Security Council will, of course, have to be declared. 
The respective resolution will at least contain all the elements that are pre' 
scribed for a belligerent blockade (geographical limits, duration). The practice 
of the Security Council also demonstrates that, for humanitarian reasons, cer, 
tain goods essential for the survival of the civilian population may be trans, 
ported to a blockaded area,129 If feasible and if not counterproductive to the 
aim pursued (restoration of international peace and security), the Security 
Council will also ensure that access to ports and coasts of third States is not 
barred. However, an important exception applies. Despite allegations to the 
contrary,130 in the case of enforcement measures under Chapter VII, there is 
no room for neutrality. Therefore, third States may well be affected by a block, 
ade ordered pursuant to Article 42. Affected States, according to Article 50, 
have the right to "consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of 
those (= economic) problems." A second exception concerns the applicability 
of the doctrine of continuous voyage. Situations are conceivable in which the 
Security Council is forced to order the capture of vessels (and aircraft) at great 
distance from the blockade area if international peace and security cannot oth, 
erwise be restored. Finally, in view of the binding force of the decisions taken 
under Chapter VII and of the ultimate goal of maintaining international peace 
and security, a blockade pursuant to Article 42 will not have to fully comply 
with the principle of effectiveness. I3I 
It must, however, be realized that, in view of the lack of UN armed forces 
proper, a blockade ordered by the Security Council will always be maintained 
and enforced by the members of the United Nations and their (national) armed 
forces. Those forces are bound by the rules and principles of the maritime jus in 
bello that, according to the position taken here, has to be considered an "order 
of necessity." That legal order has to be conceived of as primarily formulating 
duties which, as a minimum, have to be observed if States resort to the use of 
armed force. 132 In other words, the restrictions contained in the rules of war 
are, in principle, the most that international law is ready to accept when States 
are unwilling or unable to refrain from the use of armed force. This means that, 
when ordered to maintain and enforce a blockade pursuant to Article 42, they 
may only deviate from the rules of blockade law described above if there is an 
express decision by the Security Council to that effect. Whether and to what 
extent the Security Council is entitled to,exempt member States from the re, 
strictions of the maritime jus in bello will depend on the circumstances of each 
case. In that regard, the Security Councils discretion is wide but-especially 
with regard to the elementary considerations of humanity-not unlimited. 
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Blockade und Kriegskonterbande, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VOLKERRECHT UNO BUNDESST AATSRECHT, 
Beiheft zum IV. Bande, Breslau 1910, p. 6 ff. 
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54(1) of Additional Protocol I would create a new prohibition on the starvation of civilians as a 
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